Another odd news article I translated from the Chinese press 10 years ago.
Translated and edited by D. Christopher Harry, freelance translator
"Deng Family Restaurant" Closed Yesterday for Doing Business under the Banner of Deng Xiaoping
The "Deng Family Restaurant" which was the focus of a news scrum these last two days was closed yesterday. This reporter arrived on the scene to find the two characters "Deng Family" had been taken down, the twin black cat/white cat sculptures were no longer in front of the restaurant, and the characters "Deng Xiaoping has led us to prosperity" were also cleaned off the restaurant window. Pictures of Deng's life and work were also removed form the interior of the restaurant. The restaurant's owner, Meng Jiawan, said that staff from the Yongdingmenwai Street Office of Industry and Commerce in Beijing's Chongwen District came to his restaurant the day before yesterday to inform him to close the restaurant . As they explained, there was nothing wrong with the name "Deng Family Restaurant" and the promotion of the late paramount leader's theories and thinking; only that his name could not be used for the purpose of doing business.
One official from the Chongwen District Bureau of Industry and Commerce who refused to reveal his identity said that the restaurant was forced to close down possibly for being suspected of false advertising and unfair competition. In his opinion, despite the fact that the restaurant did not use the late leader's name explicitly, the twin black cat/white cat sculptures out front, and the 80-odd pictures of Deng inside the restaurant make it clear to customers that the "Deng Family Restaurant" is borrowing the fame of China's former leader to attract business. This is in violation of a statute forbidding the use of the names of great leaders for commercial purposes. In addition, many of the dishes in the restaurant have no connection with Deng Xiaoping. Thus, the "Deng Family Restaurant" is also suspected of misleading customers about facts relating to the deceased leader.
Restaurant owner, Meng Jiawan, had told a reporter that he had been inspired by another restaurant under the name of "Mao Family Dishes" to borrow the name of Deng Xiaoping, also born in his hometown of Guang'an in Sichuan province. "I revere Deng Xiaoping and I wanted to promote both his greatness and his achievements.", Mr. Meng said.
Prior to this incident, the Chongwen District Bureau of Industry and Commerce had ordered the "Mao Family Dishes" restaurant in the same district to cease operations due to the restaurant owner's claims about which dishes Mao Zedong was most partial to. By the same token, this practice also violates relevant provisions of an advertising law which prohibits using living or deceased national leaders for the purpose of promoting business.
Cui Hong (Beijing Morning Post 2001-11-04)
Tuesday, 21 June 2011
Tuesday, 28 December 2010
Foreign Press Reveals Cracks in Chinese Government Propaganda Regarding “China-made” High-Speed Trains
(Written by Ji Mi’ou based on materials translated from the foreign press by He Li) Source: www.aboluowang.com
Here is an interesting follow-up news item to my previous “Highly Speculative Rant” which puts some more meat on my bone of contention with China’s state media deception.
China Rail boasts that the high-speed trains springing up across the country, and built with world-class technology, are now completely homemade and were designed and built by a group of Chinese engineers.And yet, it would seem at present, that the sheer intelligence of the engineers who were the creators of this authentic intellectual property has surpassed the level of ability that even China Rail would have us believe. After building these new high-speed trains, which we now see spreading across China, it appears as if they decided to write the operating manual to be used by the train operators in English － not Chinese.
This minor detail was discovered in an enthusiastic paean entitled “China’s Number One High-Speed Train Operator”, a propagandistic work published by the Chinese Communist Party recounting the achievements of Li Dongxiao.
When giving an interview for China’s state media, Li Dongxiao talked at length about a bet he had with a German engineer. The German engineer said that Li Dongxiao could not possibly learn how to operate the new “China-made” high-speed train in time to complete the first test-run of the Beijing-Tianjin high-speed railway before the 2008 Olympics. However, as Li Dongxiao explained it, after fighting bravely around the clock and through unremitting efforts, he and his team translated the English operating manual into Chinese in only 9 days and learned how to operate this new-type train. Li Dongxiao had won the bet with that German engineer, but as to why a German engineer was participating in this “China-made” high-speed train project, no explanation was given in related news coverage.
Even so, Li Dongxiao’s account cannot help but lead one to ask the following question: Why would the Chinese engineers, who invented such advanced high-speed technology, use purely technical English to write an operating manual to provide for Chinese operators who only speak Chinese?
Another possible explanation is that, as they were eagerly absorbing and digesting railway technology from Siemens, Alstom, Bombardier, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and other foreign companies, somebody forgot that they should have finished translating the operating manuals first before bestowing a “Chinese brand” on the trains.
English translation by Chris Harry
Here is an interesting follow-up news item to my previous “Highly Speculative Rant” which puts some more meat on my bone of contention with China’s state media deception.
China Rail boasts that the high-speed trains springing up across the country, and built with world-class technology, are now completely homemade and were designed and built by a group of Chinese engineers.And yet, it would seem at present, that the sheer intelligence of the engineers who were the creators of this authentic intellectual property has surpassed the level of ability that even China Rail would have us believe. After building these new high-speed trains, which we now see spreading across China, it appears as if they decided to write the operating manual to be used by the train operators in English － not Chinese.
This minor detail was discovered in an enthusiastic paean entitled “China’s Number One High-Speed Train Operator”, a propagandistic work published by the Chinese Communist Party recounting the achievements of Li Dongxiao.
When giving an interview for China’s state media, Li Dongxiao talked at length about a bet he had with a German engineer. The German engineer said that Li Dongxiao could not possibly learn how to operate the new “China-made” high-speed train in time to complete the first test-run of the Beijing-Tianjin high-speed railway before the 2008 Olympics. However, as Li Dongxiao explained it, after fighting bravely around the clock and through unremitting efforts, he and his team translated the English operating manual into Chinese in only 9 days and learned how to operate this new-type train. Li Dongxiao had won the bet with that German engineer, but as to why a German engineer was participating in this “China-made” high-speed train project, no explanation was given in related news coverage.
Even so, Li Dongxiao’s account cannot help but lead one to ask the following question: Why would the Chinese engineers, who invented such advanced high-speed technology, use purely technical English to write an operating manual to provide for Chinese operators who only speak Chinese?
Another possible explanation is that, as they were eagerly absorbing and digesting railway technology from Siemens, Alstom, Bombardier, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and other foreign companies, somebody forgot that they should have finished translating the operating manuals first before bestowing a “Chinese brand” on the trains.
English translation by Chris Harry
Saturday, 18 December 2010
A Highly Speculative Political Rant: Party Pseudo-logic, High-Speed Trains and Mental Programming
Rant Disclaimer
Please note that the main intent of this article is not to bash the Chinese government or its people, but rather to expose the falseness which is so commonplace in its state-run media and which could have devastating consequences for the future of Sino-International relations. I believe that China’s communist-led education system has resulted in black-and-white attitudes towards critical thinking when it comes to social and political analysis, more especially when any Westerner dares to make such analysis regarding China. If any Chinese should feel offended by the following analysis I am very sorry that I cannot apologise for what I believe to be true. Chinese people themselves tackle political problems in their own country with increasing vigour and success, so I believe it is only fair and equal that foreigners like myself who have studied most major aspects of China, possess intimate knowledge of Mandarin Chinese and who have lived in China for many years, also have the right to an opinion and, in fact, have an obligation to speak up against intentional political manipulation. If Chinese have the right to critically analyse their own society and other nations, the same should be held true for non-Chinese analysis toward China. This is what is called fairness and equality. If Chinese people make critical statements about their own government, then logically they should not reject the right of non-Chinese individuals to do so as well. To do otherwise would be hypocritical!
Well this whole rant started from a seemingly perfectly innocent announcement on a Chinese television news programme:
“It takes an average of 10 to 15 years for countries to develop high-speed trains attaining speeds of 250 km/h. China came out with its own in 3 years.”
This was a statement I heard on one of China Central Television’s news programme a couple of days ago. Although it appears to be a perfectly bland and innocuous statement, it represents an example of Chinese Communist pseudo-logical propaganda, which quietly creeps into the ears and minds of many unsuspecting Chinese listeners because they are not presented with the immunising force of scrutiny and rational criticism and/or because they lack political awareness. In a nutshell, such statements serve the purpose of uniting the Chinese people under the Party by imbuing them with a sense of pride and patriotism, by any means necessary, in order to display the outstanding achievements or perhaps even superiority of China, which in turn is attributed to the correct and superior leadership of the Party. And that’s not necessarily all bad. Most governments promote patriotism and unity for the nation in some form or other. Still, there is a line that governments should not cross. They should not promote unhealthy or faulty nationalist pride through deception for their own political ends.
If we were to break down the subliminal message of the above statement regarding China’s achievement in the field of high-speed train development, its core message might read something like this: “China’s superiority is due to China’s wise, benevolent and exceptionally efficient government so all of the happy and proud people of China stand behind the Communist Party. For example, we developed high-speed trains several times faster than other countries.” Thus, the implication is that China is superior to other countries because either Chinese are smarter than other people or more efficient at developing these high-speed trains, hence we developed them much faster. But, of course, to be perfectly fair, the statement about how China developed high-speed trains 3 to 5 times faster than the average country didn’t actually say why China’s accomplishment was so outstanding. Therein lies the most insidious aspect of the party’s pseudo-logic; it is left to the listener to imagine just how China managed to be so utterly exceptional. So, for example, if I was a Chinese person who watched the news and was then asked to speculate as to why China was able to develop high-speed trains several times faster than other countries, I might answer that it was because Chinese people are inherently smarter than other people or more efficient or because there is an inherent advantage to one-party dictatorship in terms of the efficiency and unity of the Chinese nation or perhaps as a result of China’s 5,000 years of glorious civilisation and culture. And it would be quite natural to think in these ways, as that is what they have been taught in school since day one, and what the news reinforces every day of their lives. At the same time, this sort of positive self-stereotyping dovetails and feeds on such false beliefs that are already fairly prevalent in Chinese society as a whole. And what is most fascinating is that, despite the countless number of times I have heard these claims of superiority based on either superior culture or mental capacity made by Chinese people of all walks of all life and levels of education, almost every single Chinese person will flatly deny admitting to such stereotypes if pointed out to them by a foreigner; just as easily as most of them would categorically reject the notion that any racism exists in the minds of Chinese people, which as we know is extremely unlikely, since racism is a part of human nature (albeit an ugly part) and exists in every society. As a whole, however, one may claim that most Chinese are very open, welcoming and friendly to foreigners. Then again, this is also true of most people on the planet, but I digress ……
Another interesting point is that this blatantly boastful statement about China’s superior train-developing skills is beautifully cloaked in the seeming neutrality of numbers, which helps to make it appear to be an objective fact, while the crucial element of this pseudo-logic is that it never explains the factual basis behind the claim. For example, is the statement implying that China developed 250 km/h high-speed trains in three years from scratch? In other words, what was the yardstick for measuring the definition of ‘developing’ in the statement? What level of technology did they start from three years ago? For instance, if they had high-speed trains that could travel 220 km/h three years ago, would it be a great achievement to add another 30 km/h of speed over a period of three years? And where did all the technology to develop these high-speed trains come from to enable the Chinese to surpass the average nation by such a high degree. Was it based on 99% independently developed Chinese technology or did 70, 80 or even possibly 97% of the technology for these trains originally come from Japan, France and Germany? If most of the technology did, in fact, come from abroad, then it would obviously be dishonest, deceitful and self-serving to suggest that China developed all of the technology for this 250 km/h high-speed train in 3 years by itself. Regardless of the actual level of truth behind the statement, the point is that we are not presented with any objective point of reference to prove or disprove this claim. Therefore another inference we might easily make from this kind of statement is that the state-run media is not necessarily concerned with or interested in objectivity or hard facts. In other words, facts are expendable and honest, responsible journalism is far less important than proving that China is superior and the fact that a superior China means a superior Chinese Communist Party and that Chinese are proud and patriotic because they have a good and effective government. And it is this very cycle of mental reinforcement that endlessly worms its way throughout China’s state run media.
Of course, there are many other classifications of such primitive mental reinforcement techniques bombarding the airwaves all over China, but the one thing they all tend to have in common is that they almost invariably attribute China’s successes to the Chinese Communist Party and therefore the intended message is that true patriotism springs from total support and obedience to the Party. The corollary of this pseudo-logic is that China’s failures are never the fault of the Party, but rather the work of traitors or enemies of China who look down on China, are afraid of China and want to sabotage it. Therefore the people should unquestionably stand behind the party, because after all, China is one big family and therefore must defeat the evildoers such as human-rights activists, or people with minds of their own, or even the sneaky and immoral Westerners or Japanese constantly conspiring against China and hatching plots to undermine it.
The most frightening thing about these primitive propaganda techniques is that they reinforce an ‘us versus them’ or ‘we’re better than they are’ mentality which seeks to create barriers between China and the world in order to control public opinion and maintain a one-party oligarchy. At the same time, such feel-good propaganda seeks to assuage a population that is dissatisfied with many serious social and economic inequalities in present-day China by constantly playing the nationalist card while distracting the populace from dwelling on the many inherent disadvantages of a totalitarian regime. Sadly, this method is reasonably successful with the lower-class, less-educated majority which also happens to be furthest removed from contact with the outside world and independent news sources.
Epilogue
I am fully aware that this rant may be misunderstood by some, however I also firmly believe that the freedom to engage in political debate can only come from actually exercising that right. And yes, I admit that there is a certain degree of subjectivity and much sarcasm in the above content, but I also believe a lot of it to be true. In today’s China, where there is still a lack of transparency and accountability, added to the vigorous efforts at deliberate deception and manipulation of the news by the Chinese government, we are often forced to speculate and to use sarcasm to counter the harmful effects of long-term exposure to its propagandistic radiation. Political pressure, however slight it may be, must be brought to bear on the collective conscience of the Communist Party of China to make good on its promises of democracy and the freedom of speech it has claimed to have instituted since 1949. Only this year, dozens of retired communist party cadres petitioned the government to respect and implement the right of citizens to freedom of speech as it is enshrined in the very constitution of the People's Republic of China. Political reform is well overdue and vital to the future stability of China, whether it be to the detriment or to the advantage of the government. Even Premier Wen Jiabao’s persistent pleas for democratic reforms have been omitted or rewritten by his own party. A government that denies its own premier the right to freedom of speech makes itself look backward, dictatorial and absurd.
Please note that the main intent of this article is not to bash the Chinese government or its people, but rather to expose the falseness which is so commonplace in its state-run media and which could have devastating consequences for the future of Sino-International relations. I believe that China’s communist-led education system has resulted in black-and-white attitudes towards critical thinking when it comes to social and political analysis, more especially when any Westerner dares to make such analysis regarding China. If any Chinese should feel offended by the following analysis I am very sorry that I cannot apologise for what I believe to be true. Chinese people themselves tackle political problems in their own country with increasing vigour and success, so I believe it is only fair and equal that foreigners like myself who have studied most major aspects of China, possess intimate knowledge of Mandarin Chinese and who have lived in China for many years, also have the right to an opinion and, in fact, have an obligation to speak up against intentional political manipulation. If Chinese have the right to critically analyse their own society and other nations, the same should be held true for non-Chinese analysis toward China. This is what is called fairness and equality. If Chinese people make critical statements about their own government, then logically they should not reject the right of non-Chinese individuals to do so as well. To do otherwise would be hypocritical!
Well this whole rant started from a seemingly perfectly innocent announcement on a Chinese television news programme:
“It takes an average of 10 to 15 years for countries to develop high-speed trains attaining speeds of 250 km/h. China came out with its own in 3 years.”
This was a statement I heard on one of China Central Television’s news programme a couple of days ago. Although it appears to be a perfectly bland and innocuous statement, it represents an example of Chinese Communist pseudo-logical propaganda, which quietly creeps into the ears and minds of many unsuspecting Chinese listeners because they are not presented with the immunising force of scrutiny and rational criticism and/or because they lack political awareness. In a nutshell, such statements serve the purpose of uniting the Chinese people under the Party by imbuing them with a sense of pride and patriotism, by any means necessary, in order to display the outstanding achievements or perhaps even superiority of China, which in turn is attributed to the correct and superior leadership of the Party. And that’s not necessarily all bad. Most governments promote patriotism and unity for the nation in some form or other. Still, there is a line that governments should not cross. They should not promote unhealthy or faulty nationalist pride through deception for their own political ends.
If we were to break down the subliminal message of the above statement regarding China’s achievement in the field of high-speed train development, its core message might read something like this: “China’s superiority is due to China’s wise, benevolent and exceptionally efficient government so all of the happy and proud people of China stand behind the Communist Party. For example, we developed high-speed trains several times faster than other countries.” Thus, the implication is that China is superior to other countries because either Chinese are smarter than other people or more efficient at developing these high-speed trains, hence we developed them much faster. But, of course, to be perfectly fair, the statement about how China developed high-speed trains 3 to 5 times faster than the average country didn’t actually say why China’s accomplishment was so outstanding. Therein lies the most insidious aspect of the party’s pseudo-logic; it is left to the listener to imagine just how China managed to be so utterly exceptional. So, for example, if I was a Chinese person who watched the news and was then asked to speculate as to why China was able to develop high-speed trains several times faster than other countries, I might answer that it was because Chinese people are inherently smarter than other people or more efficient or because there is an inherent advantage to one-party dictatorship in terms of the efficiency and unity of the Chinese nation or perhaps as a result of China’s 5,000 years of glorious civilisation and culture. And it would be quite natural to think in these ways, as that is what they have been taught in school since day one, and what the news reinforces every day of their lives. At the same time, this sort of positive self-stereotyping dovetails and feeds on such false beliefs that are already fairly prevalent in Chinese society as a whole. And what is most fascinating is that, despite the countless number of times I have heard these claims of superiority based on either superior culture or mental capacity made by Chinese people of all walks of all life and levels of education, almost every single Chinese person will flatly deny admitting to such stereotypes if pointed out to them by a foreigner; just as easily as most of them would categorically reject the notion that any racism exists in the minds of Chinese people, which as we know is extremely unlikely, since racism is a part of human nature (albeit an ugly part) and exists in every society. As a whole, however, one may claim that most Chinese are very open, welcoming and friendly to foreigners. Then again, this is also true of most people on the planet, but I digress ……
Another interesting point is that this blatantly boastful statement about China’s superior train-developing skills is beautifully cloaked in the seeming neutrality of numbers, which helps to make it appear to be an objective fact, while the crucial element of this pseudo-logic is that it never explains the factual basis behind the claim. For example, is the statement implying that China developed 250 km/h high-speed trains in three years from scratch? In other words, what was the yardstick for measuring the definition of ‘developing’ in the statement? What level of technology did they start from three years ago? For instance, if they had high-speed trains that could travel 220 km/h three years ago, would it be a great achievement to add another 30 km/h of speed over a period of three years? And where did all the technology to develop these high-speed trains come from to enable the Chinese to surpass the average nation by such a high degree. Was it based on 99% independently developed Chinese technology or did 70, 80 or even possibly 97% of the technology for these trains originally come from Japan, France and Germany? If most of the technology did, in fact, come from abroad, then it would obviously be dishonest, deceitful and self-serving to suggest that China developed all of the technology for this 250 km/h high-speed train in 3 years by itself. Regardless of the actual level of truth behind the statement, the point is that we are not presented with any objective point of reference to prove or disprove this claim. Therefore another inference we might easily make from this kind of statement is that the state-run media is not necessarily concerned with or interested in objectivity or hard facts. In other words, facts are expendable and honest, responsible journalism is far less important than proving that China is superior and the fact that a superior China means a superior Chinese Communist Party and that Chinese are proud and patriotic because they have a good and effective government. And it is this very cycle of mental reinforcement that endlessly worms its way throughout China’s state run media.
Of course, there are many other classifications of such primitive mental reinforcement techniques bombarding the airwaves all over China, but the one thing they all tend to have in common is that they almost invariably attribute China’s successes to the Chinese Communist Party and therefore the intended message is that true patriotism springs from total support and obedience to the Party. The corollary of this pseudo-logic is that China’s failures are never the fault of the Party, but rather the work of traitors or enemies of China who look down on China, are afraid of China and want to sabotage it. Therefore the people should unquestionably stand behind the party, because after all, China is one big family and therefore must defeat the evildoers such as human-rights activists, or people with minds of their own, or even the sneaky and immoral Westerners or Japanese constantly conspiring against China and hatching plots to undermine it.
The most frightening thing about these primitive propaganda techniques is that they reinforce an ‘us versus them’ or ‘we’re better than they are’ mentality which seeks to create barriers between China and the world in order to control public opinion and maintain a one-party oligarchy. At the same time, such feel-good propaganda seeks to assuage a population that is dissatisfied with many serious social and economic inequalities in present-day China by constantly playing the nationalist card while distracting the populace from dwelling on the many inherent disadvantages of a totalitarian regime. Sadly, this method is reasonably successful with the lower-class, less-educated majority which also happens to be furthest removed from contact with the outside world and independent news sources.
Epilogue
I am fully aware that this rant may be misunderstood by some, however I also firmly believe that the freedom to engage in political debate can only come from actually exercising that right. And yes, I admit that there is a certain degree of subjectivity and much sarcasm in the above content, but I also believe a lot of it to be true. In today’s China, where there is still a lack of transparency and accountability, added to the vigorous efforts at deliberate deception and manipulation of the news by the Chinese government, we are often forced to speculate and to use sarcasm to counter the harmful effects of long-term exposure to its propagandistic radiation. Political pressure, however slight it may be, must be brought to bear on the collective conscience of the Communist Party of China to make good on its promises of democracy and the freedom of speech it has claimed to have instituted since 1949. Only this year, dozens of retired communist party cadres petitioned the government to respect and implement the right of citizens to freedom of speech as it is enshrined in the very constitution of the People's Republic of China. Political reform is well overdue and vital to the future stability of China, whether it be to the detriment or to the advantage of the government. Even Premier Wen Jiabao’s persistent pleas for democratic reforms have been omitted or rewritten by his own party. A government that denies its own premier the right to freedom of speech makes itself look backward, dictatorial and absurd.
Sunday, 15 August 2010
Thursday, 22 April 2010
什么叫爱国？献给愤青和五毛党
什么叫爱国? 爱国不是按照你对它国人说出什么“草*、*泥、*马*”的次数来衡量。它是敢于面对负面的现实和坚守正面的理想, 对国家怀有进步的志愿。所以，民粹主义及其他损坏国家利益的行为和思想才不爱国！爱国也不是某个组织或人指定的。爱国是对个人和领导的一种要求, 不是盲目的、狭隘的部落意识形态。缺少主见和独立思考能力的人也谈不上真正的爱国者。
Monday, 22 February 2010
Loopholes in Environmental Impact Assessment
Loopholes in Environmental Impact Assessment
Written by Guan Zhong
The following article presents a very real and disturbing example of the threat of pollution to the ecology of Beijing and to the health of its population and how local citizens were able to expose attempts by local government departments to hide the dangers posed by a proposed refuse incineration plant. It is significant for its universality, yet at the same time for revealing the serious challenges to environmental protection faced in China. The fact that the attempt by certain key government institutions to hoodwink local citizens was effectively uncovered and made known to the public says volumes about the advancement of political rights and improvements in terms of the transparency of the press in China. On the down side, it is nothing short of terrifying to imagine that the central government, even here in the nation’s capital, was either unaware of, indifferent to, or supportive of a project which would have devastating implications for the city’s environment, including the poisoning of Beijing’s only source of drinking water.
Liulitun should loom large as a key chapter in any future written history of the management and disposal of domestic refuse in China. Not only are the residents in Liulitun fighting for the environmental rights and rights to existence that they deserve with wisdom, rationality, and persistence, they are also setting a brave and effective example for people living in Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, and other cities, in fighting for their legitimate rights and interests.
Due to suspicions and doubts raised toward the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report of a local project, the residents of Liulitun studied the report in great detail, only to discover one problem after another. And by seizing upon so many fundamental errors with the EIA, they were finally able to protect their rights with confidence and conviction. In the face of strong public resistance, the question of whether or not to build a refuse incineration power plant in Liulitun has become a real dilemma. The root of the stalemate, and a series of related consequences, lies in the Environmental Impact Assessment of the project that was released by the Beijing Academy of Environmental Sciences.
EIA Supports Incineration
Liulitun’s domestic refuse landfill site - the first phase of which was finished in 1999 and the second in 2001 - is the only domestic waste disposal facility in Beijing’s Haidian District. It was designed to handle 1,500 tons of garbage per day. Although not originally anticipated, the first phase had been fully filled within 5 years due to the increase in refuse resulting from an accelerated rate of urbanization. Based on the current refuse disposal requirements of 2,700 tons per day, the capacity of the project’s second phase will run out in 2013. Such a predicament presents a truly serious issue in urgent need of resolution.
Entrusted by the Environmental and Urban Landscape Services Center of the District of Haidian, the Beijing Academy of Environmental sciences undertook an assessment of the environmental impact of the proposed landfill and drew up an environmental impact assessment report. According to the report: “The project is feasible in terms of environmental protection, based on the condition that its implementation and design adhere to carrying out measures for the prevention and control of pollution as mentioned in the report.”
The report by the Beijing Academy of Environmental Sciences entitled, “An Environmental Impact Assessment of the Refuse Incineration Power Plant and Comprehensive Treatment Plant of Beijing’s Haidian District” was submitted by the Beijing Environmental Protection Agency, as environmental review document [2005] 1066, to the Municipal Administrative Management Commissioner of Haidain District on November 11, 2005, and posted on the Internet on January 30, 2007. The review states, “The construction of a refuse incineration power plant and a comprehensive treatment plant to the southwest of the Liulitun waste landfill has been officially approved. The proposed project is designed to dispose of 1,600 tons of waste per day, including 1,200 tons to be incinerated for power generation, and 400 tons for composting, at a total investment cost of 1 billion RMB.” The report had given the green light for the construction of the project. However, this news aroused a great stir in Liulitun. People had heard about the refuse incineration plant, but they felt the environment impact assessment on the Internet lacked credibility and were greatly shocked by the fact that the key arguments and conclusions of the assessment flew in the face of basic common sense. The malodorous gas from the garbage landfill had already affected the daily life of the residents and the number of people living near the landfill with respiratory disease as well a high incidence of tumors had clearly increased. One Liulitun resident, named Huang Shiping, who has been studying the EIA over the past several years, said: “The garbage landfill brings great harm to residents here and there is lack of strong supervision by the government. The EIA is neither objective nor scientific. Support for an incineration project here would only make it worse for Liulitun residents who have already suffered greatly.”
Project’s Site Selection Fraught with Huge Risks
The EIA concludes that, “The proposed site of the project has been selected to be located to the southwest of the Liulitun waste landfill. The project, which has already been listed in the White Paper on Beijing’s Domestic Refuse Disposal, is in accordance with urban development planning.”
There is an obvious contradiction in the statement, “… in accordance with urban development planning”. According to the Beijing Municipal Comprehensive Plan (2004-2020), the area behind the Haidian mountains has been designated as an important base for high-tech development and research and innovation in Beijing. It is a key tourist area of the city’s northwest, which should step up the pace of its development in order to fully realize urbanization. The establishment of ecological, pastoral, and modernized natural ecological systems should be combined with an urban ecological system to form a comprehensive new city district. A High quality and collectively based developmental mode should be maintained and emphasis should be placed on harmony with the surrounding natural landscape. When referring to the building of a refuse incineration power plant designed to burn 1,200 tons of garbage per day how can one possibly speak of “high quality” or “emphasizing harmony with the surrounding natural landscape”? Item 3 of article 134 in Chapter 12 of the comprehensive plan regarding municipal infrastructure clearly states, “Waste pollution is forbidden in water conservation areas and other key areas.” So how can one speak of keeping water conservation areas free of waste pollution when the proposed site for building a refuse incineration power plant is only 1 kilometer away from the Jingmi diversion canal, Beijing’s only water supply channel?
Special topographic and climatic conditions adverse to the diffusion of pollutants also exacerbate pollution and increase environmental risks. The planned location for waste incineration is in the northwest part of Beijing. According to standards outlined in The Guiding Principles for Atmospheric Environmental Assessment, the proposed site is located in an area of complex topography, which is surrounded by the foothills of Baiwang Mountain in the south, and the Yan mountain range in the west. Thus, the area has a lower solar radiation grade. In addition, the cooling of the ground surface in the area is sped up by the Jingmi diversion canal, which flows from west to east every evening. The surrounding Baiwangshan foothills form a 'dustpan' topography, which decreases the angle of wind direction and wind speed in the area. All of the aforementioned unfavorable topography and climatic conditions lead to highly stable atmospheric conditions, which may easily form a thermal inversion layer and frequently produce pollution from smoke and fume at high concentrations. Owing to the increased range in pollution caused by the thermal inversion layer’s effect on downwind pollution, in conjunction with Beijing’s dustpan topography which is surrounded on three sides by mountains, the dissipation of pollutants is made more difficult. At the same time, it also brings higher risks and exacerbates atmospheric pollution in the areas upwind of and surrounding the Liulitun Waste Incineration Power Plant.
The waste incineration factory would, in reality, increase rather than decrease the threat caused by pollution. According to the Environmental Impact Assessment, “Atmospheric projection results predict a very slight influence on the atmospheric conditions in the residential areas being assessed.” However, this viewpoint is, in fact, very difficult to support. As stated by the laws of conservation of mass, we can only change the state of matter, but not its mass. As much research work done both domestically and abroad reveals, aside from the residue created after the incineration of 1 ton of household garbage, the remainder can only be converted into approximately 5,000 cubic meters of gas. Thus, it is apparent that the harm brought about by incineration to the surrounding residents would be increased. The former brick factory, cement plant, and refuse landfill have created an enormous strain on the environment, so it would be intolerable for the citizens, already unable to bear any further affects caused by pollution, to see black fumes spewing out from an 80-meter high chimney all day. Research done by the Ecological Environmental Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Science in 1999 showed the emission of acidic gases such as carbon dioxide, sulfur oxide, and nitrogen oxide would contribute to global warming and acidification. The impact on acidification from incineration is ten times as great as that for sanitary landfills, sixteen times greater than that of simple landfills, and four times that caused by comprehensive treatment. It is a huge irony to describe such a project, which aggravates pollution problems, as a measure for alleviating pollution.
A Misinterpretation of ‘Protective Distance’
According to the results of the Environmental Assessment report, “Considering the requirements of environmental security, it is necessary to establish a sanitary protective distance of 300 meters. At present, there are no environmentally sensitive targets within a distance of 300 meters.” But the distance mentioned above refers to the protective distance from the odorous stench of a sanitary landfill site, while here it is misrepresented as the appropriate protective distance to safeguard against the effects of gaseous pollution from an incineration plant.
Closely connected to protective distance is the concept of sensitive targets. A military unit is located to the north of the planned Liulitun incineration plant, the Xiliu Construction workers dormitory is located within 200 meters, and the Yongyou Software Park is located within 500 meters of the proposed site. With respect to the Liulitun incineration plant - including the seismic belt, the Jingmi diversion canal, over 200, 000 local residents, the Beijing Botanical Garden, the Fragrance Hill Park, the Yuan Ming Yuan Relics Park, the Summer Palace, and the site of a military unit - which of these cannot be considered as sensitive targets? As Huang Shiping points out, the planned incineration plant is only 7 kilometers away from Yuquan Mountain and the Summer Palace, a world cultural heritage site and a state-level imperial garden, and is also within 5 kilometers distance of Fragrance Hill Park - a natural scenic spot, the Beijing Botanical Garden - an ecological natural reserve, the Daoxiang Lake Manmade Wetland Park, and the Baiwang Mountain Forest Park. As to the question of whether or not such areas are sensitive, the answer could not be more obvious.
Surrounding the planned incineration plant site are many scientific research institutes and high-tech enterprises, such as the Beijing Aerospace City (an astronaut training center), the Zhongguancun Science and Technology Park, and the Yongfeng Industrial Base, etc., among which Yongyou Software Park is only 200 meters away from the refuse landfill, and less than 500 meters away from the planned incineration power plant. At the same time, many medium and large-sized residential areas have been built in the vicinity, such as Yihe Villas, Qianqiu Gardens, Jade Water Gardens, Baiwang Jasmine Gardens, Zhonghai Fenglian Villas, Autumn Dew Gardens, Summer Rain Gardens, Baoli West Hill Forest Gardens, etc. In addition, there are also plans to build more residential complexes and residential services projects, including the Capital Iron and Steel Co. Estate, the Beijing University International Hospital, Phoenix City, and so on. The site chosen for the incineration plant is next to several Science and Technology Parks such as the Yongfeng High-tech Industrial Base, Zhongguancun Software Park, Aerospace City, the Shangdi Information Industry Base, etc. - an area comprised of a population of several hundred thousand employees and residents. It is truly inconceivable that building a refuse incineration plant in such a densely populated residential area could not be considered ‘sensitive’.
Persistent Shadow of Dioxins Hard to Dispel
The EIA report states: “The refuse incineration plant intends to invite bids for the use of advanced and mature foreign technology and equipment, while dioxin emission levels will meet EU Standards.” During administrative review pleadings on dioxin emission standards, the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau stated: “In terms of dioxin, which is of concern to the general public, our national emission standard is 1 nanogram per normal cubic meter, while there are even stricter controls set in the design of this project, so that emission concentrations may also meet the strictest current standards of developed nations of 0.1 nanograms per normal cubic meter. This figure is beyond dispute in international academic circles and there are no related control threshold values with respect to environmental risks.” Yet this conclusion is overly absolute and does not match up the reality of the situation. The incineration of refuse at high temperatures inevitably produces dioxins, as does the cooling process. Although applicable in theory, based on many years of practice both domestically and abroad, the technology of preventing the production of dioxins in the rapid cooling process, as well as the absorption of dioxins, has yet to meet with satisfying results and, in many cases, has led to failures. The EIA report claims that the detection of dioxins can only be carried out by examining the concentration of carbon monoxide in the smoke produced by incinerating refuse, so as to indirectly measure the concentration of dioxin emissions. According to section 7.3.3 of “The Technical Standards for Domestic Waste Incineration Engineering”: “In 1977, it was first reported in Austria that dioxins were detected from within the electrostatic device of a domestic waste incinerator furnace. The concentrations of dioxins in the smoke from the vent of an electrostatic precipitator with a temperature of less than 300°C are 100 times greater than that from the vent of a refuse incinerator furnace at a temperature of 800°C.” Thus, re-synthesis of dioxin will occur at temperatures below 800°C. Furthermore, the primary heavy metal component in domestic waste is copper, which acts as a catalyst for producing dioxin. Therefore, merely depending on testing carbon monoxide emission concentrations to determine the emission concentration of dioxin is unreliable. Internationally speaking, it is currently impossible to conduct on-line detection of dioxins.
Deliberately Avoiding the Question of Water Pollution
The “EIA Report” deliberately chose less stringent monitoring of the quality of surface water and groundwater within the area of the proposed project by avoiding examining the impact of incinerated pollutants such as dioxins, heavy metals, mercury and other substances on the surface water, especially on that of the Jingmi diversion canal. The incineration of refuse converts solid waste into highly toxic gaseous pollutants. Dioxins and heavy metals produced by refuse incineration have an enormously harmful effect on humans, as well as on animals and plants. The project’s EIA report calculates, “the highest ground-level concentrations of dioxins would occur at a distance of 1,332 meters downwind of the chimney” while the proposed site for the Liulitun incineration plant is only 1,114 meters away from the Jingmi diversion canal - a key protected zone of the municipality of Beijing - and precisely the area in which the maximum concentration of heavy metals and dioxins would occur. Gases resulting from the incineration of refuse would cause varying degrees of pollution within a five-kilometer-wide radius, resulting in irreversible damage to the unique ecological environment of Beijing’s West Mountain area, while the surrounding downwind and downstream terrain will aid in creating even more widespread pollution.
The EIA report has deliberately avoided characteristic pollutants. In the EIA report there are a total of 11 items for testing underground water quality including: pH, total hardness, total dissolved solids, chloride, ammonia nitrogen, nitrate, nitrite, sulfate, volatile phenols, total bacterial count, and total coliform bacterial count. In fact, the required inspection items for the testing of groundwater quality standards are as follows: pH, ammonia, nitrate, nitrite, salt, volatile phenols, cyanide, arsenic, mercury, chromium (hexavalent), total hardness, lead, fluorine, cadmium, iron, manganese, total dissolved solids, permanganate index, sulfate, chloride, coliform bacteria, as well as other items to reflect the main issues associated with water quality in the area around the proposed project site. This means that characteristic pollutant heavy metals such as arsenic, mercury, chromium (hexavalent), lead, fluorine, cadmium, iron, manganese, etc., which comprise more than 10 items, were simply not included in the scope of EIA testing. Not surprisingly, the EIA report claimed: “According to four test points of drinking water of groundwater streams in samples taken from four drinking water wells at depths of 80 to 100 meters, the water is of good quality and meets all the necessary requirements for drinking water.” Heavy metals, such as arsenic, mercury, chromium (hexavalent), lead, fluorine, cadmium, iron, manganese, etc., accounting for more than ten sensitive items which would reflect the main water quality issues of the Liulitun area, were simply not tested. Thus, it would be odd indeed if testing results showed that water quality failed to meet drinking water quality requirements.
Erroneous Facts Concerning Public Participation
As the EIA report describes: “A total of 100 questionnaires were issued during the evaluation period and 85 of them were returned. According to statistics, 100% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the current state of the landfill, while 71% agreed to the waste incineration project, and 51% agreed to waste incineration in addition to comprehensive treatment. ” In response, the local residents of Liulitun sent out 400 of their own questionnaires and 387 were returned within a week, of which 358 were valid. Statistical analysis indicated that 98% of people were opposed to the building of the Liulitun incineration plant, while 2% were indifferent. 97.5% of respondents believed that the proposed waste incineration power plant’s pollution prevention and control measures were unreliable, and 96.9% of people believed environmental pollution caused by the building of a refuse incineration plant to be unacceptable. 93.2% of people believed the building of the refuse incineration power plant would have a negative impact on economic development in the surrounding area, while 94.9% of people believed that the incineration plant would have a harmful influence on the lives of the local residents. 95.5% of the people did not accept the argument that the proposed refuse incineration power plant would reduce the impact of the landfill on the surrounding environment. Analysis of the survey also showed that only 3.9% of people believed that the proposed waste incineration power plant would benefit their living and working conditions and that only 6.2% of people believed that it would be beneficial to the development of the local economy.
Originally translated by George Liu
Re-translated and edited by Chris Harry
Written by Guan Zhong
The following article presents a very real and disturbing example of the threat of pollution to the ecology of Beijing and to the health of its population and how local citizens were able to expose attempts by local government departments to hide the dangers posed by a proposed refuse incineration plant. It is significant for its universality, yet at the same time for revealing the serious challenges to environmental protection faced in China. The fact that the attempt by certain key government institutions to hoodwink local citizens was effectively uncovered and made known to the public says volumes about the advancement of political rights and improvements in terms of the transparency of the press in China. On the down side, it is nothing short of terrifying to imagine that the central government, even here in the nation’s capital, was either unaware of, indifferent to, or supportive of a project which would have devastating implications for the city’s environment, including the poisoning of Beijing’s only source of drinking water.
Liulitun should loom large as a key chapter in any future written history of the management and disposal of domestic refuse in China. Not only are the residents in Liulitun fighting for the environmental rights and rights to existence that they deserve with wisdom, rationality, and persistence, they are also setting a brave and effective example for people living in Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, and other cities, in fighting for their legitimate rights and interests.
Due to suspicions and doubts raised toward the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report of a local project, the residents of Liulitun studied the report in great detail, only to discover one problem after another. And by seizing upon so many fundamental errors with the EIA, they were finally able to protect their rights with confidence and conviction. In the face of strong public resistance, the question of whether or not to build a refuse incineration power plant in Liulitun has become a real dilemma. The root of the stalemate, and a series of related consequences, lies in the Environmental Impact Assessment of the project that was released by the Beijing Academy of Environmental Sciences.
EIA Supports Incineration
Liulitun’s domestic refuse landfill site - the first phase of which was finished in 1999 and the second in 2001 - is the only domestic waste disposal facility in Beijing’s Haidian District. It was designed to handle 1,500 tons of garbage per day. Although not originally anticipated, the first phase had been fully filled within 5 years due to the increase in refuse resulting from an accelerated rate of urbanization. Based on the current refuse disposal requirements of 2,700 tons per day, the capacity of the project’s second phase will run out in 2013. Such a predicament presents a truly serious issue in urgent need of resolution.
Entrusted by the Environmental and Urban Landscape Services Center of the District of Haidian, the Beijing Academy of Environmental sciences undertook an assessment of the environmental impact of the proposed landfill and drew up an environmental impact assessment report. According to the report: “The project is feasible in terms of environmental protection, based on the condition that its implementation and design adhere to carrying out measures for the prevention and control of pollution as mentioned in the report.”
The report by the Beijing Academy of Environmental Sciences entitled, “An Environmental Impact Assessment of the Refuse Incineration Power Plant and Comprehensive Treatment Plant of Beijing’s Haidian District” was submitted by the Beijing Environmental Protection Agency, as environmental review document [2005] 1066, to the Municipal Administrative Management Commissioner of Haidain District on November 11, 2005, and posted on the Internet on January 30, 2007. The review states, “The construction of a refuse incineration power plant and a comprehensive treatment plant to the southwest of the Liulitun waste landfill has been officially approved. The proposed project is designed to dispose of 1,600 tons of waste per day, including 1,200 tons to be incinerated for power generation, and 400 tons for composting, at a total investment cost of 1 billion RMB.” The report had given the green light for the construction of the project. However, this news aroused a great stir in Liulitun. People had heard about the refuse incineration plant, but they felt the environment impact assessment on the Internet lacked credibility and were greatly shocked by the fact that the key arguments and conclusions of the assessment flew in the face of basic common sense. The malodorous gas from the garbage landfill had already affected the daily life of the residents and the number of people living near the landfill with respiratory disease as well a high incidence of tumors had clearly increased. One Liulitun resident, named Huang Shiping, who has been studying the EIA over the past several years, said: “The garbage landfill brings great harm to residents here and there is lack of strong supervision by the government. The EIA is neither objective nor scientific. Support for an incineration project here would only make it worse for Liulitun residents who have already suffered greatly.”
Project’s Site Selection Fraught with Huge Risks
The EIA concludes that, “The proposed site of the project has been selected to be located to the southwest of the Liulitun waste landfill. The project, which has already been listed in the White Paper on Beijing’s Domestic Refuse Disposal, is in accordance with urban development planning.”
There is an obvious contradiction in the statement, “… in accordance with urban development planning”. According to the Beijing Municipal Comprehensive Plan (2004-2020), the area behind the Haidian mountains has been designated as an important base for high-tech development and research and innovation in Beijing. It is a key tourist area of the city’s northwest, which should step up the pace of its development in order to fully realize urbanization. The establishment of ecological, pastoral, and modernized natural ecological systems should be combined with an urban ecological system to form a comprehensive new city district. A High quality and collectively based developmental mode should be maintained and emphasis should be placed on harmony with the surrounding natural landscape. When referring to the building of a refuse incineration power plant designed to burn 1,200 tons of garbage per day how can one possibly speak of “high quality” or “emphasizing harmony with the surrounding natural landscape”? Item 3 of article 134 in Chapter 12 of the comprehensive plan regarding municipal infrastructure clearly states, “Waste pollution is forbidden in water conservation areas and other key areas.” So how can one speak of keeping water conservation areas free of waste pollution when the proposed site for building a refuse incineration power plant is only 1 kilometer away from the Jingmi diversion canal, Beijing’s only water supply channel?
Special topographic and climatic conditions adverse to the diffusion of pollutants also exacerbate pollution and increase environmental risks. The planned location for waste incineration is in the northwest part of Beijing. According to standards outlined in The Guiding Principles for Atmospheric Environmental Assessment, the proposed site is located in an area of complex topography, which is surrounded by the foothills of Baiwang Mountain in the south, and the Yan mountain range in the west. Thus, the area has a lower solar radiation grade. In addition, the cooling of the ground surface in the area is sped up by the Jingmi diversion canal, which flows from west to east every evening. The surrounding Baiwangshan foothills form a 'dustpan' topography, which decreases the angle of wind direction and wind speed in the area. All of the aforementioned unfavorable topography and climatic conditions lead to highly stable atmospheric conditions, which may easily form a thermal inversion layer and frequently produce pollution from smoke and fume at high concentrations. Owing to the increased range in pollution caused by the thermal inversion layer’s effect on downwind pollution, in conjunction with Beijing’s dustpan topography which is surrounded on three sides by mountains, the dissipation of pollutants is made more difficult. At the same time, it also brings higher risks and exacerbates atmospheric pollution in the areas upwind of and surrounding the Liulitun Waste Incineration Power Plant.
The waste incineration factory would, in reality, increase rather than decrease the threat caused by pollution. According to the Environmental Impact Assessment, “Atmospheric projection results predict a very slight influence on the atmospheric conditions in the residential areas being assessed.” However, this viewpoint is, in fact, very difficult to support. As stated by the laws of conservation of mass, we can only change the state of matter, but not its mass. As much research work done both domestically and abroad reveals, aside from the residue created after the incineration of 1 ton of household garbage, the remainder can only be converted into approximately 5,000 cubic meters of gas. Thus, it is apparent that the harm brought about by incineration to the surrounding residents would be increased. The former brick factory, cement plant, and refuse landfill have created an enormous strain on the environment, so it would be intolerable for the citizens, already unable to bear any further affects caused by pollution, to see black fumes spewing out from an 80-meter high chimney all day. Research done by the Ecological Environmental Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Science in 1999 showed the emission of acidic gases such as carbon dioxide, sulfur oxide, and nitrogen oxide would contribute to global warming and acidification. The impact on acidification from incineration is ten times as great as that for sanitary landfills, sixteen times greater than that of simple landfills, and four times that caused by comprehensive treatment. It is a huge irony to describe such a project, which aggravates pollution problems, as a measure for alleviating pollution.
A Misinterpretation of ‘Protective Distance’
According to the results of the Environmental Assessment report, “Considering the requirements of environmental security, it is necessary to establish a sanitary protective distance of 300 meters. At present, there are no environmentally sensitive targets within a distance of 300 meters.” But the distance mentioned above refers to the protective distance from the odorous stench of a sanitary landfill site, while here it is misrepresented as the appropriate protective distance to safeguard against the effects of gaseous pollution from an incineration plant.
Closely connected to protective distance is the concept of sensitive targets. A military unit is located to the north of the planned Liulitun incineration plant, the Xiliu Construction workers dormitory is located within 200 meters, and the Yongyou Software Park is located within 500 meters of the proposed site. With respect to the Liulitun incineration plant - including the seismic belt, the Jingmi diversion canal, over 200, 000 local residents, the Beijing Botanical Garden, the Fragrance Hill Park, the Yuan Ming Yuan Relics Park, the Summer Palace, and the site of a military unit - which of these cannot be considered as sensitive targets? As Huang Shiping points out, the planned incineration plant is only 7 kilometers away from Yuquan Mountain and the Summer Palace, a world cultural heritage site and a state-level imperial garden, and is also within 5 kilometers distance of Fragrance Hill Park - a natural scenic spot, the Beijing Botanical Garden - an ecological natural reserve, the Daoxiang Lake Manmade Wetland Park, and the Baiwang Mountain Forest Park. As to the question of whether or not such areas are sensitive, the answer could not be more obvious.
Surrounding the planned incineration plant site are many scientific research institutes and high-tech enterprises, such as the Beijing Aerospace City (an astronaut training center), the Zhongguancun Science and Technology Park, and the Yongfeng Industrial Base, etc., among which Yongyou Software Park is only 200 meters away from the refuse landfill, and less than 500 meters away from the planned incineration power plant. At the same time, many medium and large-sized residential areas have been built in the vicinity, such as Yihe Villas, Qianqiu Gardens, Jade Water Gardens, Baiwang Jasmine Gardens, Zhonghai Fenglian Villas, Autumn Dew Gardens, Summer Rain Gardens, Baoli West Hill Forest Gardens, etc. In addition, there are also plans to build more residential complexes and residential services projects, including the Capital Iron and Steel Co. Estate, the Beijing University International Hospital, Phoenix City, and so on. The site chosen for the incineration plant is next to several Science and Technology Parks such as the Yongfeng High-tech Industrial Base, Zhongguancun Software Park, Aerospace City, the Shangdi Information Industry Base, etc. - an area comprised of a population of several hundred thousand employees and residents. It is truly inconceivable that building a refuse incineration plant in such a densely populated residential area could not be considered ‘sensitive’.
Persistent Shadow of Dioxins Hard to Dispel
The EIA report states: “The refuse incineration plant intends to invite bids for the use of advanced and mature foreign technology and equipment, while dioxin emission levels will meet EU Standards.” During administrative review pleadings on dioxin emission standards, the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau stated: “In terms of dioxin, which is of concern to the general public, our national emission standard is 1 nanogram per normal cubic meter, while there are even stricter controls set in the design of this project, so that emission concentrations may also meet the strictest current standards of developed nations of 0.1 nanograms per normal cubic meter. This figure is beyond dispute in international academic circles and there are no related control threshold values with respect to environmental risks.” Yet this conclusion is overly absolute and does not match up the reality of the situation. The incineration of refuse at high temperatures inevitably produces dioxins, as does the cooling process. Although applicable in theory, based on many years of practice both domestically and abroad, the technology of preventing the production of dioxins in the rapid cooling process, as well as the absorption of dioxins, has yet to meet with satisfying results and, in many cases, has led to failures. The EIA report claims that the detection of dioxins can only be carried out by examining the concentration of carbon monoxide in the smoke produced by incinerating refuse, so as to indirectly measure the concentration of dioxin emissions. According to section 7.3.3 of “The Technical Standards for Domestic Waste Incineration Engineering”: “In 1977, it was first reported in Austria that dioxins were detected from within the electrostatic device of a domestic waste incinerator furnace. The concentrations of dioxins in the smoke from the vent of an electrostatic precipitator with a temperature of less than 300°C are 100 times greater than that from the vent of a refuse incinerator furnace at a temperature of 800°C.” Thus, re-synthesis of dioxin will occur at temperatures below 800°C. Furthermore, the primary heavy metal component in domestic waste is copper, which acts as a catalyst for producing dioxin. Therefore, merely depending on testing carbon monoxide emission concentrations to determine the emission concentration of dioxin is unreliable. Internationally speaking, it is currently impossible to conduct on-line detection of dioxins.
Deliberately Avoiding the Question of Water Pollution
The “EIA Report” deliberately chose less stringent monitoring of the quality of surface water and groundwater within the area of the proposed project by avoiding examining the impact of incinerated pollutants such as dioxins, heavy metals, mercury and other substances on the surface water, especially on that of the Jingmi diversion canal. The incineration of refuse converts solid waste into highly toxic gaseous pollutants. Dioxins and heavy metals produced by refuse incineration have an enormously harmful effect on humans, as well as on animals and plants. The project’s EIA report calculates, “the highest ground-level concentrations of dioxins would occur at a distance of 1,332 meters downwind of the chimney” while the proposed site for the Liulitun incineration plant is only 1,114 meters away from the Jingmi diversion canal - a key protected zone of the municipality of Beijing - and precisely the area in which the maximum concentration of heavy metals and dioxins would occur. Gases resulting from the incineration of refuse would cause varying degrees of pollution within a five-kilometer-wide radius, resulting in irreversible damage to the unique ecological environment of Beijing’s West Mountain area, while the surrounding downwind and downstream terrain will aid in creating even more widespread pollution.
The EIA report has deliberately avoided characteristic pollutants. In the EIA report there are a total of 11 items for testing underground water quality including: pH, total hardness, total dissolved solids, chloride, ammonia nitrogen, nitrate, nitrite, sulfate, volatile phenols, total bacterial count, and total coliform bacterial count. In fact, the required inspection items for the testing of groundwater quality standards are as follows: pH, ammonia, nitrate, nitrite, salt, volatile phenols, cyanide, arsenic, mercury, chromium (hexavalent), total hardness, lead, fluorine, cadmium, iron, manganese, total dissolved solids, permanganate index, sulfate, chloride, coliform bacteria, as well as other items to reflect the main issues associated with water quality in the area around the proposed project site. This means that characteristic pollutant heavy metals such as arsenic, mercury, chromium (hexavalent), lead, fluorine, cadmium, iron, manganese, etc., which comprise more than 10 items, were simply not included in the scope of EIA testing. Not surprisingly, the EIA report claimed: “According to four test points of drinking water of groundwater streams in samples taken from four drinking water wells at depths of 80 to 100 meters, the water is of good quality and meets all the necessary requirements for drinking water.” Heavy metals, such as arsenic, mercury, chromium (hexavalent), lead, fluorine, cadmium, iron, manganese, etc., accounting for more than ten sensitive items which would reflect the main water quality issues of the Liulitun area, were simply not tested. Thus, it would be odd indeed if testing results showed that water quality failed to meet drinking water quality requirements.
Erroneous Facts Concerning Public Participation
As the EIA report describes: “A total of 100 questionnaires were issued during the evaluation period and 85 of them were returned. According to statistics, 100% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the current state of the landfill, while 71% agreed to the waste incineration project, and 51% agreed to waste incineration in addition to comprehensive treatment. ” In response, the local residents of Liulitun sent out 400 of their own questionnaires and 387 were returned within a week, of which 358 were valid. Statistical analysis indicated that 98% of people were opposed to the building of the Liulitun incineration plant, while 2% were indifferent. 97.5% of respondents believed that the proposed waste incineration power plant’s pollution prevention and control measures were unreliable, and 96.9% of people believed environmental pollution caused by the building of a refuse incineration plant to be unacceptable. 93.2% of people believed the building of the refuse incineration power plant would have a negative impact on economic development in the surrounding area, while 94.9% of people believed that the incineration plant would have a harmful influence on the lives of the local residents. 95.5% of the people did not accept the argument that the proposed refuse incineration power plant would reduce the impact of the landfill on the surrounding environment. Analysis of the survey also showed that only 3.9% of people believed that the proposed waste incineration power plant would benefit their living and working conditions and that only 6.2% of people believed that it would be beneficial to the development of the local economy.
Originally translated by George Liu
Re-translated and edited by Chris Harry
Tuesday, 9 June 2009
Lijiang and the Naxi People
Foreword
My apologies to those who have may have taken an interest in this blog site in terms of the lack of more current affairs content to date. Up until now, I have been going over some of my old writings and translations to try to build up a base of content. Nevertheless, I thought this article that I wrote fifteen years ago might be of interest to those who wanted to get a glimpse of some of the ethnic richness that pervades this huge nation. The preamble to the article describes some of my own thoughts about the China of the time, and to my delight, is somewhat prescient vis-à-vis trends in China’s recent development.
Lijiang: Remote and Traditional (1994)
Written by Chris Harry
Long before travelling to the remote city of Lijiang, I had already learned to avoid forming idealistic expectations of the places I intended to visit. Although I had gradually learned to reconcile such expectations, I had always dreamed of visiting a place where I would be able to experience traditional Chinese culture firsthand. The ideal vision of China at once mysterious, ornate, and profound, however, did not mesh with a truly accurate description of the real China. The China of the nineties may be described as a high speed train surging ahead at breakneck speed, with a largely untested braking system, along an unfinished track. In relative terms, the casual observer may be tempted to look upon urban China as being hugely overcrowded, dirty, and in many respects drab and full of noise and pollution. In spite of this, the unique character of China’s cultures and peoples (56 ethnic groups), the intricately woven tapestry of its history, and the breathtaking scope, beauty, and diversity of its landscape still shine through if you scratch beneath this dull veneer. It is not a place for the casual observer. It is a country that demands intensive study, yet often defies explanation; a nation an outsider must strive to appreciate, and by having done so can never forget, nor completely avoid being shaped by.
At many points during my stay in China, and after much reflection and discussions with Chinese friends, I discovered a great dichotomy in the thinking of tourists and travellers from industrialised nations in China and the Chinese attitudes toward themselves and their past. While Europeans, Japanese, and North Americans often look to a mystical past to fill a spiritual void, Chinese are now enthralled with wealth, luxury, and modernity for the same reason. Westerners crave to rediscover a feeling of magic and philosophic contentment by projecting such yearnings upon ancient civilizations and exotic destinations. By the same token, Chinese people from all levels of society are bent on eliminating poverty, outdated traditions, feudal superstitions, and any other impediments to the transformation of their nation into an advanced, industrialized superpower. Essentially, westerners are striving, vicariously, to regain traditional culture through more ancient nations while the Chinese realise they must forgo many aspects of such traditional culture in order to achieve their dreams of enjoying the same sort of lifestyle we take for granted in the industrialized world.
In fact, westerners must begin to modify their feelings of superiority toward what we consider as quaint but backward nations such as China. While westerners bide their time waiting for the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party the Chinese are busy making money and modernizing. Whether it be fifty to seventy years or quite possibly even twenty to thirty years from now, the Chinese will catch up with us. At that time, neither their people nor their government will hold a humble and deferent attitude toward the great western powers, as the balance of power will have already been altered. At that time, westerners may also come to the realisation that their cultural and political pre-eminence has been maintained in large part by their supremacy in the economic and military spheres and not by any intrinsic superiority.
By the sheer fact of its huge population and size, China will always pose a potential challenge and therefore a threat to the global dominance of the United States, Western European powers, and Japan. Given the means, Chinese will opt for a position of strength rather than weakness.
The best example of this complete divergence in thinking may be seen in the attitudes of people from affluent nations and that of the Chinese toward that enigmatic and age-old land called Tibet. While we marvel at the distinctiveness of an exotic and remote culture that has been astonishingly well preserved, the Chinese see this cultural heritage as a hindrance to the development of education, medicine, technology, and the economy of Tibet.
Lijiang is a place embodying much of this diverse and fascinating cultural heritage; a place with a traditional air inhabited by an open-minded and cultured people. Comparatively little pollution, beautiful scenery, and a very relaxed pace of life, coupled with the well-preserved Ming dynasty architecture of the old core of the city make Lijiang a haven for those in search of the seemingly ineffable --- traditional Chinese culture. Apart from the inviting, and in some cases spectacular scenery surrounding this relatively small, isolated city, many customs and elements of traditional culture have also been preserved along with its Ming architecture, making the long and arduous trip here well worthwhile.
Within the walls of the ancient city, the older generation still follow traditional ways, which reflect their openness toward Han, Tibetan and other cultures and their adherence to Naxi ways. Lijiang is the centre of Naxi culture; a culture characterized by, among other things, its matriarchal roots.
Almost all of the Lijiang residents with the last names Mu and He are ethnically Naxi (pronounced Na-khee in Naxi language). The ancestors of Naxi people bearing the surname Mu were once aristocrats during the Tang dynasty while their counterparts with the surname of He were originally labourers.
Only the elderly women still wear traditional garb. The exact pattern and style of ethnic male dress has long been forgotten, yet it is known that it primarily consisted of several pieces of animal hide, in addition to a red sash tied around the waist.
Among the older generation, the women in this distinctive society undertake most of the heavy labour while the men are responsible for the preservation of Naxi cultural traditions such as music, painting, and calligraphy, and for assuming the role of educators. Because of this, the women tend to spend more time outside of the house, often gathering together in groups to sit and chat, or to take strolls together, while the men have more leisure time and tend to stick closer to home. Once a month, the women of each household within a circle of friends, take turns hosting a party where only women attend to enjoy food and dishes that are prepared by the given host. At such gatherings they will talk and play cards. The fact that men and women often spend much of their day segregated from members of the opposite sex is an indication of how traditional and unique their culture remains.
Xuan Ke, the leader of a local traditional music ensemble, gave a Naxi interpretation of the relationship between women and men in Naxi society by saying that while Han (Chinese) males regarded women as property, Naxi males looked upon women as their mothers. In all fairness, in my experience the Han majority in is as much or more respectful of women’s rights than any of China’s 56 ethnic groups. In some respects, however, the Naxi women take on leading roles in the community, but this status is also likely borne of the fact that they have more responsibilities and heavier burdens than their male counterparts, at least among the older more traditional members of society. As far as I could tell, Naxi men did not display any outward sign of physical aggression or disrespect toward women.
The seven disc-shaped patterns and the sun and moon embroidered on the back of traditional female dress expresses the idea that the Naxi women work diligently both day and night. Since the women in traditional families do most of the work in, and outside of the home, they are also in charge of the finances. Nowadays, however, in some families the women no longer have absolute control of the purse strings.
For the most part, elderly men stay at home and often watch over their grandchildren. As distinct from areas primarily populated by Han Chinese, it is common to see men carrying children on their backs. This seems to suggest that there is a less pronounced delineation of the kinds of distinctive male and female codes of conduct within Naxi society which are common in many cultures. Elderly women tend to separate themselves from the men and children more, although it is also possible to see some women carrying babies on their back.
One family, my wife and I spent an afternoon with while in Lijiang, embodied many aspects of the different traditional roles that men and women take on in Lijiang. This was the family of Zhou Lin, a famous Naxi painter and poet, who was also the former head of Lijiang’s traditional Dongjing music ensemble. His two sons, Zhou Fuding and his younger brother, are both accomplished painters. Their extended family includes the two brothers’ families, along with their mother.
The family lives within the “old city” inside a complex of walled residences much like traditional Beijing Hutongs (quadrangles) or the traditional long houses of Hanoi. All three styles of architecture are characterized by a monolithic structure that is divided into square walled units with an open courtyard in the middle. Each square unit represent one family home, each of which appears the same from the outside, as there are only high, straight walls usually with no windows or open sections facing the street. In effect, they are sealed off from the surrounding area. Lijiang’s walled compounds differ from Hutongs, or long houses, because they are two-storey, as opposed to one-storey structures. In addition, these structures are built in groups of seven-family units. In between these buildings are a series of narrow stone lanes (granite). Some houses have up to 20 family members living together under one roof. A small river has been diverted to run through these neighbourhoods to provide drinking water and irrigation for the inhabitants of this Ming style architectural city complex.
In fact, part of a canal near a stone bridge, in an open square located in the heart of the city, becomes the scene for an annual festival where the locals begin setting afloat handcrafted and hand painted paper boats with lit candles about one hour before sunset. The candles are believed to act as beacons for the ghosts of their ancestors who are allowed to return from a Chinese version of Hades to find their families and visit them for a few days each year. This is originally a Han Chinese festival that has been adopted and preserved by the Naxi but which is now rarely, if ever, practised by the Han themselves.
Another truly fascinating aspect of Naxi culture is their written language known in Chinese as Dongbawen or Shaman Script. The Dongba script, invented 1100 years ago by a Dongba or Naxi Shaman, is said to be a “living fossil” among languages because it is considered to be the only pictographic writing system still in use today. In fact, Chinese scholars describe it as being even more primitive, in terms of comparative linguistic development, than Chinese writing was at the time of the Shang dynasty (2200-1100 B.C.). This is due to the remoteness of the Naxi people’s homeland and to their strong sense of tradition. One hundred and fifty years after the script first came into use, it ceased to undergo any further development or changes to its written form.
A school for the promotion of preserving Dongba script has now been established and there are about 40 students presently enrolled. He Zhiwu, a Naxi scholar, devoted his life to collecting Dongba classics. There are about 20 000 still in existence, many of which are now in Japan, Germany, and the United States.
A Dongba we met at a local tourist attraction, which acts as both a museum and a showcase of Naxi culture, took out some scrolls he had written in Dongba script. Most of the writings in the Naxi script appear to be records of historical events and legends. One scroll that he translated into Chinese for us described a world in which man, heaven, and beasts communicated with one another. It told of how a crow flew up to heaven and flew back down to relate what it knew of heaven to a human. In a very general sense, this legend, at least, appears to resemble the animist mythology of Amerindian and Northeast Asian Shamanist cultures.
Only three Dongba or Naxi Shaman are still living today. Two are in their mid-seventies and the third is 85. They still perform ceremonies, but only for the rural community. One Dongba we met, aged 74, said he started studying for this role at age 12. Sadly though, the younger generation, just as in many parts of the world, does not seem to be too interested in carrying on the Dongba tradition.
There are nine traditional Naxi orchestras in the Lijiang area. The most famous band, led by Xuan Ke, has performed in Sichuan, Kunming, Beijing, as well as in various cities in Europe and America. In September of 1995, the same orchestra was invited to perform in ten countries across Europe. One of the stops on their tour included a concert at Cambridge University. This ensemble, along with others in Lijiang, has preserved a form of ancient music from the Tang dynasty. It is referred to as Dongjing music, a kind of ceremonial Daoist music dating back 900 to 1000 years. This local musical tradition represents the only surviving continuous link to Tang era Daoist musical arrangements. Such music was played during palace ceremonies. Many of the instruments they use or have collected are over one hundred to four hundred years old. The band members’ ages range from 16 to 86. The older musicians are training young musicians to continue the tradition. Some of the pieces they have preserved, including a composition written by the Tang Emperor, Xuanzong, had been presumed lost by musicologists. When Xuan Ke’s orchestra performed in Beijing, and that it became evident that many of the ancient musical pieces thought to be lost had, in fact, been preserved and passed down, tears ran down the faces of many old professors in the audience.
Naxi musical instruments include the Naxi-style erhu (Chinese two-stringed violin) as well as two types of instruments similar to the Jew’s harp and which are played in the same manner. One type is made out of wood, and has only one movable piece, while another type is made out of brass and has three movable parts, each having its own tone.
Xuan Ke, the leader of Lijiang’s famous orchestra, was without a doubt the most flamboyant and interesting individual I met in Lijiang, and I would guess he could easily be in the running for one of China’s most fascinating personages. Despite the fact that he had spent 19 years in jail for criticizing the government, he continued his tirades against the government and against what he considered to be Han chauvinism toward his people. He was also outspoken and unapologetic about the devastation brought about by the Japanese army decades earlier and made a point of educating every listener before he would allow the ensemble to play. The evening I decided to see a performance, the largest single group in this international backpacking rabble of music lovers happened to be Japanese tourists. The other members of the orchestra quietly waited for him to finish. Although they seemed impatient, their leader appeared to have a tight grip on power over the group. Interestingly enough, these lectures were delivered in fairly fluent and clear English, as he had attended a Christian missionary school as a child. He enjoyed listening to himself and he knew that he was, in fact, an interesting personality.
Near Lijiang is a place called Luguhu or Lugu Lake, where the Mosuo people live in a matrilineal society to this day. One branch of the Mosuo still live in a primitive mountaintop settlement in caves and use carved stones for their tools and furniture. It is believed that the Naxi are descended from the Mosuo.
Many foreign tourists and scholars are attracted by this unique and distant city. One American professor even spent 27 years of his life here.
In terms of keeping the peace, one local resident said that the police were not effective enough. Groups of military police carrying sticks while patrolling the streets are a common sight in Lijiang. Yesterday evening, a policeman knocked on our hotel room door. Two young girls were standing in the hallway while at least one other policeman was also present. I opened the door, asked what was wrong, and he immediately left without asking any questions. Some of the locals intimated that there is a certain degree of violence in Lijiang, such as drunken brawls, due to an underdeveloped economy and lower levels of education. In general, it seems that the drug trade affects most communities in Yunnan province.
I saw only one beggar over the span of my ten-day visit here and he was severely crippled. When I asked about this situation, I was told that there were a certain number of beggars, many of whom were farmers accustomed to begging, even though they already had enough to eat. Strangely enough, this kind of social phenomenon seemed to be fairly common in one form or another throughout China. I have heard of farmers on the outskirts of Beijing who encourage their kids to beg food from strangers. Perhaps in this way they can make a few extra yuan selling more of the produce they would have otherwise set aside for their family.
About 80 percent of Lijiang’s population are Naxi. The remaining 20 percent include 10 percent Han and 10 percent Yi, Bai, and Zang (Tibetan) minorities. The Naxi language is a branch of the Yi language under the Tibeto-Burman group of the Sino-Tibetan language family. Here, Han and other ethnic groups speak Naxi while Naxi also speak Mandarin Chinese.
The Naxi are a fairly culturally advanced people, who have been strongly influenced by other nationalities, but have not assimilated with Han culture, as have their neighbours the Bai minority. The Naxi have been absorbing Han culture since the Tang dynasty, and were also heavily influenced by the Bai people since the period of the Southern Zhao (748-902) and Dali Kingdoms (937-1253). At that time, Lijiang was a vassal state under the successive Bai kingdoms. In addition to these influences, Zang (Tibetan) religion and handicrafts have also helped to mould and shape their culture. This openness and cultural adaptability is due, in part, to the fact that the Naxi people have always been a kind of ‘little brother’ to their more powerful neighbours such as the Bai, Zang, Han, and Yi peoples. Their flexibility has allowed them to be on good terms with other minority groups, which by contrast, have not always been able to get along well with each other. During the Ming dynasty, the leader of the Naxi people was versed in Chinese, Tibetan, and Dongba script. Tibetan religious banners (in Chinese, known as Jingfan) and Tibetan calligraphy can be seen in Lamaist temples in the rural areas just outside of Lijiang. On our visit to the Baisha murals, located in the outlying areas of Lijiang, we came across an elderly calligrapher displaying his works in Chinese, Naxi, and Tibetan scripts.
One of the last remaining Dongba did not describe Naxi culture in exclusive terms, as is so common with many cultures. Rather, he pointed to the parallels between Naxi culture and other cultures. Certainly, the impression one gets from the Naxi in Lijiang is that they have nothing to hide and that they are willing to invite you into their homes and share their experiences with you.
Chinese-style Buddhism is the predominant religion among the Naxi, but they have also embraced Lamaist Buddhism, Daoism, and to a lesser extent, Islam and even Christianity.
Traditional carpentry and smithing products are sold widely. Copper and brass pots, as well as Tibetan silver bracelets and Tibetan cowbone necklaces are common. Wooden plates, cups, and bowls are very simple in design but are often carved, sanded, and polished quite beautifully by the local craftsmen.
In the larger context of Chinese history, Lijiang was often a haven for political refugees. Some of the Chinese descendants of imperial families and aristocrats from the Tang to the Ming dynasties still live in Lijiang today. One of the musicians in the traditional music ensemble is an eleventh generation descendant of Nanjing courtiers (the capital of China at the time) in the Ming dynasty. Another local resident told us that his family was directly descended from the Ming dynasty’s founding emperor Zhao Kuangyi. After the collapse of the Ming dynasty, the emperor’s relatives had to flee to the far-flung regions of China to avoid certain death.
All in and all, Lijiang is a place of diverse cultural and historical influences surrounded by some stunning natural scenery. No doubt many changes have taken place since my wife and I visited the remote city some fifteen years ago, and I have heard tell from others of the commercialisation brought about by tourism over the years. Still, if I were to hazard a guess, I would say that it remains a unique and rewarding experience for any travellers wishing to visit there.
My apologies to those who have may have taken an interest in this blog site in terms of the lack of more current affairs content to date. Up until now, I have been going over some of my old writings and translations to try to build up a base of content. Nevertheless, I thought this article that I wrote fifteen years ago might be of interest to those who wanted to get a glimpse of some of the ethnic richness that pervades this huge nation. The preamble to the article describes some of my own thoughts about the China of the time, and to my delight, is somewhat prescient vis-à-vis trends in China’s recent development.
Lijiang: Remote and Traditional (1994)
Written by Chris Harry
Long before travelling to the remote city of Lijiang, I had already learned to avoid forming idealistic expectations of the places I intended to visit. Although I had gradually learned to reconcile such expectations, I had always dreamed of visiting a place where I would be able to experience traditional Chinese culture firsthand. The ideal vision of China at once mysterious, ornate, and profound, however, did not mesh with a truly accurate description of the real China. The China of the nineties may be described as a high speed train surging ahead at breakneck speed, with a largely untested braking system, along an unfinished track. In relative terms, the casual observer may be tempted to look upon urban China as being hugely overcrowded, dirty, and in many respects drab and full of noise and pollution. In spite of this, the unique character of China’s cultures and peoples (56 ethnic groups), the intricately woven tapestry of its history, and the breathtaking scope, beauty, and diversity of its landscape still shine through if you scratch beneath this dull veneer. It is not a place for the casual observer. It is a country that demands intensive study, yet often defies explanation; a nation an outsider must strive to appreciate, and by having done so can never forget, nor completely avoid being shaped by.
At many points during my stay in China, and after much reflection and discussions with Chinese friends, I discovered a great dichotomy in the thinking of tourists and travellers from industrialised nations in China and the Chinese attitudes toward themselves and their past. While Europeans, Japanese, and North Americans often look to a mystical past to fill a spiritual void, Chinese are now enthralled with wealth, luxury, and modernity for the same reason. Westerners crave to rediscover a feeling of magic and philosophic contentment by projecting such yearnings upon ancient civilizations and exotic destinations. By the same token, Chinese people from all levels of society are bent on eliminating poverty, outdated traditions, feudal superstitions, and any other impediments to the transformation of their nation into an advanced, industrialized superpower. Essentially, westerners are striving, vicariously, to regain traditional culture through more ancient nations while the Chinese realise they must forgo many aspects of such traditional culture in order to achieve their dreams of enjoying the same sort of lifestyle we take for granted in the industrialized world.
In fact, westerners must begin to modify their feelings of superiority toward what we consider as quaint but backward nations such as China. While westerners bide their time waiting for the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party the Chinese are busy making money and modernizing. Whether it be fifty to seventy years or quite possibly even twenty to thirty years from now, the Chinese will catch up with us. At that time, neither their people nor their government will hold a humble and deferent attitude toward the great western powers, as the balance of power will have already been altered. At that time, westerners may also come to the realisation that their cultural and political pre-eminence has been maintained in large part by their supremacy in the economic and military spheres and not by any intrinsic superiority.
By the sheer fact of its huge population and size, China will always pose a potential challenge and therefore a threat to the global dominance of the United States, Western European powers, and Japan. Given the means, Chinese will opt for a position of strength rather than weakness.
The best example of this complete divergence in thinking may be seen in the attitudes of people from affluent nations and that of the Chinese toward that enigmatic and age-old land called Tibet. While we marvel at the distinctiveness of an exotic and remote culture that has been astonishingly well preserved, the Chinese see this cultural heritage as a hindrance to the development of education, medicine, technology, and the economy of Tibet.
Lijiang is a place embodying much of this diverse and fascinating cultural heritage; a place with a traditional air inhabited by an open-minded and cultured people. Comparatively little pollution, beautiful scenery, and a very relaxed pace of life, coupled with the well-preserved Ming dynasty architecture of the old core of the city make Lijiang a haven for those in search of the seemingly ineffable --- traditional Chinese culture. Apart from the inviting, and in some cases spectacular scenery surrounding this relatively small, isolated city, many customs and elements of traditional culture have also been preserved along with its Ming architecture, making the long and arduous trip here well worthwhile.
Within the walls of the ancient city, the older generation still follow traditional ways, which reflect their openness toward Han, Tibetan and other cultures and their adherence to Naxi ways. Lijiang is the centre of Naxi culture; a culture characterized by, among other things, its matriarchal roots.
Almost all of the Lijiang residents with the last names Mu and He are ethnically Naxi (pronounced Na-khee in Naxi language). The ancestors of Naxi people bearing the surname Mu were once aristocrats during the Tang dynasty while their counterparts with the surname of He were originally labourers.
Only the elderly women still wear traditional garb. The exact pattern and style of ethnic male dress has long been forgotten, yet it is known that it primarily consisted of several pieces of animal hide, in addition to a red sash tied around the waist.
Among the older generation, the women in this distinctive society undertake most of the heavy labour while the men are responsible for the preservation of Naxi cultural traditions such as music, painting, and calligraphy, and for assuming the role of educators. Because of this, the women tend to spend more time outside of the house, often gathering together in groups to sit and chat, or to take strolls together, while the men have more leisure time and tend to stick closer to home. Once a month, the women of each household within a circle of friends, take turns hosting a party where only women attend to enjoy food and dishes that are prepared by the given host. At such gatherings they will talk and play cards. The fact that men and women often spend much of their day segregated from members of the opposite sex is an indication of how traditional and unique their culture remains.
Xuan Ke, the leader of a local traditional music ensemble, gave a Naxi interpretation of the relationship between women and men in Naxi society by saying that while Han (Chinese) males regarded women as property, Naxi males looked upon women as their mothers. In all fairness, in my experience the Han majority in is as much or more respectful of women’s rights than any of China’s 56 ethnic groups. In some respects, however, the Naxi women take on leading roles in the community, but this status is also likely borne of the fact that they have more responsibilities and heavier burdens than their male counterparts, at least among the older more traditional members of society. As far as I could tell, Naxi men did not display any outward sign of physical aggression or disrespect toward women.
The seven disc-shaped patterns and the sun and moon embroidered on the back of traditional female dress expresses the idea that the Naxi women work diligently both day and night. Since the women in traditional families do most of the work in, and outside of the home, they are also in charge of the finances. Nowadays, however, in some families the women no longer have absolute control of the purse strings.
For the most part, elderly men stay at home and often watch over their grandchildren. As distinct from areas primarily populated by Han Chinese, it is common to see men carrying children on their backs. This seems to suggest that there is a less pronounced delineation of the kinds of distinctive male and female codes of conduct within Naxi society which are common in many cultures. Elderly women tend to separate themselves from the men and children more, although it is also possible to see some women carrying babies on their back.
One family, my wife and I spent an afternoon with while in Lijiang, embodied many aspects of the different traditional roles that men and women take on in Lijiang. This was the family of Zhou Lin, a famous Naxi painter and poet, who was also the former head of Lijiang’s traditional Dongjing music ensemble. His two sons, Zhou Fuding and his younger brother, are both accomplished painters. Their extended family includes the two brothers’ families, along with their mother.
The family lives within the “old city” inside a complex of walled residences much like traditional Beijing Hutongs (quadrangles) or the traditional long houses of Hanoi. All three styles of architecture are characterized by a monolithic structure that is divided into square walled units with an open courtyard in the middle. Each square unit represent one family home, each of which appears the same from the outside, as there are only high, straight walls usually with no windows or open sections facing the street. In effect, they are sealed off from the surrounding area. Lijiang’s walled compounds differ from Hutongs, or long houses, because they are two-storey, as opposed to one-storey structures. In addition, these structures are built in groups of seven-family units. In between these buildings are a series of narrow stone lanes (granite). Some houses have up to 20 family members living together under one roof. A small river has been diverted to run through these neighbourhoods to provide drinking water and irrigation for the inhabitants of this Ming style architectural city complex.
In fact, part of a canal near a stone bridge, in an open square located in the heart of the city, becomes the scene for an annual festival where the locals begin setting afloat handcrafted and hand painted paper boats with lit candles about one hour before sunset. The candles are believed to act as beacons for the ghosts of their ancestors who are allowed to return from a Chinese version of Hades to find their families and visit them for a few days each year. This is originally a Han Chinese festival that has been adopted and preserved by the Naxi but which is now rarely, if ever, practised by the Han themselves.
Another truly fascinating aspect of Naxi culture is their written language known in Chinese as Dongbawen or Shaman Script. The Dongba script, invented 1100 years ago by a Dongba or Naxi Shaman, is said to be a “living fossil” among languages because it is considered to be the only pictographic writing system still in use today. In fact, Chinese scholars describe it as being even more primitive, in terms of comparative linguistic development, than Chinese writing was at the time of the Shang dynasty (2200-1100 B.C.). This is due to the remoteness of the Naxi people’s homeland and to their strong sense of tradition. One hundred and fifty years after the script first came into use, it ceased to undergo any further development or changes to its written form.
A school for the promotion of preserving Dongba script has now been established and there are about 40 students presently enrolled. He Zhiwu, a Naxi scholar, devoted his life to collecting Dongba classics. There are about 20 000 still in existence, many of which are now in Japan, Germany, and the United States.
A Dongba we met at a local tourist attraction, which acts as both a museum and a showcase of Naxi culture, took out some scrolls he had written in Dongba script. Most of the writings in the Naxi script appear to be records of historical events and legends. One scroll that he translated into Chinese for us described a world in which man, heaven, and beasts communicated with one another. It told of how a crow flew up to heaven and flew back down to relate what it knew of heaven to a human. In a very general sense, this legend, at least, appears to resemble the animist mythology of Amerindian and Northeast Asian Shamanist cultures.
Only three Dongba or Naxi Shaman are still living today. Two are in their mid-seventies and the third is 85. They still perform ceremonies, but only for the rural community. One Dongba we met, aged 74, said he started studying for this role at age 12. Sadly though, the younger generation, just as in many parts of the world, does not seem to be too interested in carrying on the Dongba tradition.
There are nine traditional Naxi orchestras in the Lijiang area. The most famous band, led by Xuan Ke, has performed in Sichuan, Kunming, Beijing, as well as in various cities in Europe and America. In September of 1995, the same orchestra was invited to perform in ten countries across Europe. One of the stops on their tour included a concert at Cambridge University. This ensemble, along with others in Lijiang, has preserved a form of ancient music from the Tang dynasty. It is referred to as Dongjing music, a kind of ceremonial Daoist music dating back 900 to 1000 years. This local musical tradition represents the only surviving continuous link to Tang era Daoist musical arrangements. Such music was played during palace ceremonies. Many of the instruments they use or have collected are over one hundred to four hundred years old. The band members’ ages range from 16 to 86. The older musicians are training young musicians to continue the tradition. Some of the pieces they have preserved, including a composition written by the Tang Emperor, Xuanzong, had been presumed lost by musicologists. When Xuan Ke’s orchestra performed in Beijing, and that it became evident that many of the ancient musical pieces thought to be lost had, in fact, been preserved and passed down, tears ran down the faces of many old professors in the audience.
Naxi musical instruments include the Naxi-style erhu (Chinese two-stringed violin) as well as two types of instruments similar to the Jew’s harp and which are played in the same manner. One type is made out of wood, and has only one movable piece, while another type is made out of brass and has three movable parts, each having its own tone.
Xuan Ke, the leader of Lijiang’s famous orchestra, was without a doubt the most flamboyant and interesting individual I met in Lijiang, and I would guess he could easily be in the running for one of China’s most fascinating personages. Despite the fact that he had spent 19 years in jail for criticizing the government, he continued his tirades against the government and against what he considered to be Han chauvinism toward his people. He was also outspoken and unapologetic about the devastation brought about by the Japanese army decades earlier and made a point of educating every listener before he would allow the ensemble to play. The evening I decided to see a performance, the largest single group in this international backpacking rabble of music lovers happened to be Japanese tourists. The other members of the orchestra quietly waited for him to finish. Although they seemed impatient, their leader appeared to have a tight grip on power over the group. Interestingly enough, these lectures were delivered in fairly fluent and clear English, as he had attended a Christian missionary school as a child. He enjoyed listening to himself and he knew that he was, in fact, an interesting personality.
Near Lijiang is a place called Luguhu or Lugu Lake, where the Mosuo people live in a matrilineal society to this day. One branch of the Mosuo still live in a primitive mountaintop settlement in caves and use carved stones for their tools and furniture. It is believed that the Naxi are descended from the Mosuo.
Many foreign tourists and scholars are attracted by this unique and distant city. One American professor even spent 27 years of his life here.
In terms of keeping the peace, one local resident said that the police were not effective enough. Groups of military police carrying sticks while patrolling the streets are a common sight in Lijiang. Yesterday evening, a policeman knocked on our hotel room door. Two young girls were standing in the hallway while at least one other policeman was also present. I opened the door, asked what was wrong, and he immediately left without asking any questions. Some of the locals intimated that there is a certain degree of violence in Lijiang, such as drunken brawls, due to an underdeveloped economy and lower levels of education. In general, it seems that the drug trade affects most communities in Yunnan province.
I saw only one beggar over the span of my ten-day visit here and he was severely crippled. When I asked about this situation, I was told that there were a certain number of beggars, many of whom were farmers accustomed to begging, even though they already had enough to eat. Strangely enough, this kind of social phenomenon seemed to be fairly common in one form or another throughout China. I have heard of farmers on the outskirts of Beijing who encourage their kids to beg food from strangers. Perhaps in this way they can make a few extra yuan selling more of the produce they would have otherwise set aside for their family.
About 80 percent of Lijiang’s population are Naxi. The remaining 20 percent include 10 percent Han and 10 percent Yi, Bai, and Zang (Tibetan) minorities. The Naxi language is a branch of the Yi language under the Tibeto-Burman group of the Sino-Tibetan language family. Here, Han and other ethnic groups speak Naxi while Naxi also speak Mandarin Chinese.
The Naxi are a fairly culturally advanced people, who have been strongly influenced by other nationalities, but have not assimilated with Han culture, as have their neighbours the Bai minority. The Naxi have been absorbing Han culture since the Tang dynasty, and were also heavily influenced by the Bai people since the period of the Southern Zhao (748-902) and Dali Kingdoms (937-1253). At that time, Lijiang was a vassal state under the successive Bai kingdoms. In addition to these influences, Zang (Tibetan) religion and handicrafts have also helped to mould and shape their culture. This openness and cultural adaptability is due, in part, to the fact that the Naxi people have always been a kind of ‘little brother’ to their more powerful neighbours such as the Bai, Zang, Han, and Yi peoples. Their flexibility has allowed them to be on good terms with other minority groups, which by contrast, have not always been able to get along well with each other. During the Ming dynasty, the leader of the Naxi people was versed in Chinese, Tibetan, and Dongba script. Tibetan religious banners (in Chinese, known as Jingfan) and Tibetan calligraphy can be seen in Lamaist temples in the rural areas just outside of Lijiang. On our visit to the Baisha murals, located in the outlying areas of Lijiang, we came across an elderly calligrapher displaying his works in Chinese, Naxi, and Tibetan scripts.
One of the last remaining Dongba did not describe Naxi culture in exclusive terms, as is so common with many cultures. Rather, he pointed to the parallels between Naxi culture and other cultures. Certainly, the impression one gets from the Naxi in Lijiang is that they have nothing to hide and that they are willing to invite you into their homes and share their experiences with you.
Chinese-style Buddhism is the predominant religion among the Naxi, but they have also embraced Lamaist Buddhism, Daoism, and to a lesser extent, Islam and even Christianity.
Traditional carpentry and smithing products are sold widely. Copper and brass pots, as well as Tibetan silver bracelets and Tibetan cowbone necklaces are common. Wooden plates, cups, and bowls are very simple in design but are often carved, sanded, and polished quite beautifully by the local craftsmen.
In the larger context of Chinese history, Lijiang was often a haven for political refugees. Some of the Chinese descendants of imperial families and aristocrats from the Tang to the Ming dynasties still live in Lijiang today. One of the musicians in the traditional music ensemble is an eleventh generation descendant of Nanjing courtiers (the capital of China at the time) in the Ming dynasty. Another local resident told us that his family was directly descended from the Ming dynasty’s founding emperor Zhao Kuangyi. After the collapse of the Ming dynasty, the emperor’s relatives had to flee to the far-flung regions of China to avoid certain death.
All in and all, Lijiang is a place of diverse cultural and historical influences surrounded by some stunning natural scenery. No doubt many changes have taken place since my wife and I visited the remote city some fifteen years ago, and I have heard tell from others of the commercialisation brought about by tourism over the years. Still, if I were to hazard a guess, I would say that it remains a unique and rewarding experience for any travellers wishing to visit there.
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